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 INTRODUCTION 
Passed in 1916, the National Defense Act created the Council of National Defense, headed by 
the Secretary of War, handling matters of national defense and security. By the time the Council of 
National Defense was actually established, the original intent of the Council had been diluted, 
significantly dampening its ability to propose policy.1 Following World War I, discussions began 
regarding the need for a centralized body or council to address military issues and to streamline the 
defense process.2 In 1919, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt created the 
Joint Planning Making Body as a means to address the overlapping issues between the Departments 
of State, War, and the Navy.3 From 1919 through 1945, there was little opportunity to address the 
needs of military reform because the preponderance of government resources were devoted to 
addressing the Great Depression and World War II. Several recommendations, programs, and 
policies were proposed during this period before it was generally realized that none were 
comprehensive enough to address the underlying issues.4 
Not until World War II and the return to a more stable economy did an opportunity arise to 
address the needs for a centralized military. The actions and tactics of World War II made clear the 
need for better communication and cooperation between the different executive departments that, 
in the past, were notorious for not cooperating with one another.5 Following World War II, the 
                                                 
1 Hammond, Paul Y., “The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination: An 
Interpretation and Appraisal,” The American Political Science Review 54, no. 4 (1960): 899. 
2 Johnson, Franklyn A., “The British Committee of Imperial Defence: Prototype of U.S. Security Organization,” The 
Journal of Politics 23, no. 2 (1961): 244. The British Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was started in 1904 under many 
of the same concerns the United States would begin to discuss over the next thirty years. Many of the structures of CID 
were incorporated into the structure and final formation of the National Security Council. 
3 Shoemaker, Christopher C., The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 6. 
4 Souers, Sidney W., “Policy Formation for National Security,” The American Political Science Review 43, no. 3 (1949): 
534. One of the more cohesive and successful steps taken prior to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 was 
the creation of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) later reorganized as the State, Army, Navy, Air 
Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC).  
5 Etzold, Thomas H., “American Organization for National Security 1945–50,” in Containment: Documents on American 
Policy and Strategy, 1945–50, edited by Thomas H. Etzhold and John Lewis Gaddis, 1–23, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1978,) 1–2. 
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urgency to examine the need for a centralized military force was addressed by passing the National 
Security Act of 1947 and National Security Act Amendments of 1949, creating the National Security 
Council and the Department of Defense, along with other organizations, to help facilitate the 
streamlined process.6 Many of the individuals and executive departments affected by the 
recommendations and subsequent restructures that occurred throughout this process did not 
welcome the change.7 
At the beginning of the transformation, Congressional leaders often controlled when and how 
policies and reforms happened. This control allowed Congressional leaders to be centralized in the 
self-governing process. By the end of the transformation, the power of policymaking shifted, 
elevating the President and members of the executive to the center of power.8 As a result, the ability 
for members of Congress to open or close policy windows drastically shrank, compared to the 
ability of the President, where possibilities grew considerably. This paper will explore the case study 
of national security and defense policy reform from 1916 through 1949, specifically creating the 
military establishment as we know it today. 
Initially identified in 1916 as an issue the United States needed to explore, an adequate solution 
for national security and defense policy was not reached for another thirty-three years where all of 
the concerns expressed by the legislative and executive branches were addressed. One of the reasons 
reforming national security and defense policy in the United States took as long as it did, was the 
number of powerful and influential individuals that were reluctant to support any recommendation 
that would remove power from their posts or change the access to the President they once enjoyed.9 
One of the ploys to stall military departmental unification came from Secretary of the Navy, James 
                                                 
6 Nelson, Anna Kasten, “President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council,” The Journal of 
American History 72, no 2 (1985): 360. 
7 Hammond, “National Security Council Coordination,” 899. 
8 Foucault, Michael, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 206–207. 
9 Shoemaker, The NSC Staff, 7. 
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Forrestal, following World War II. Forrestal was concerned that any unification with the 
Department of the Army would relegate the Navy to “second-class status.”10 Forrestal 
commissioned Ferdinand Eberstadt to develop a plan to address national security issues and how to 
best unify the departments. Eberstadt had considerable experience working with the military 
establishment, including serving as Vice Chairman of the War Production Board and as Chairman of 
the Army-Navy Munitions Board.11 As expected, the Eberstadt Report and recommendation worked 
to discredit the need for unification of the two military branches under a single department.12 The 
report did demonstrate, however, the need for better collaboration between the military branches.13 
To conceptualize the national security and defense policy reform, the process has been broken 
into four stages by Christopher Shoemaker; they include the “conceptual period (1920–1945), the 
birth [period] (1945–1949), the growth period (1949–1968), and the constitutional maturity (1969–
present).”14 I contest Shoemaker’s claim that the conceptual period actually began in 1916 with the 
National Defense Act of 1916, making the conception period from 1916–1945.15 For this study, I 
analyzed two periods of reform evolution—the conceptual period from 1916–1941 and the birth 
period from 1941–1949.  
From the time of identification until the final reform was made by the National Security Act 
Amendments of 1949, there were numerous recommendations that attempted to grapple with the 
restructuring. This study will explore the evolution of the different national security and defense 
policy recommendations, policy initiatives, and organizational restructures. Understanding the 
                                                 
10 Shoemaker, The NSC Staff, 9. 
11 Perez, Robert C. and Edward F. Willett, The Will to Win: A Biography of Ferdinand Eberstadt, (New York, 
Greenwood Press, 1989), 1–2. 
12 Shoemaker, The NSC Staff, 9. The Eberstadt Report did recommend the creation of the National Security Council. 
13 U.S. Congress, “Report to Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, on Unification of the Wart and Navy 
Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security,” Committee on Naval Affairs, U.S. Senate, 79th Congress, 
(Washington, D.C., 22 October 1945). Commonly referred to as the “Eberstadt Report” or “Eberstadt 
Recommendations.” The recommendations from Eberstadt to Navy Secretary Forrestal and President Truman later 
translated directly into the National Security Act of 1947. 
14 Shoemaker, The NSC Staff, 6. 
15 Hammond, “Device for Interdepartmental Coordination,” 899. 
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evolution of the reform process requires exploring multiple facets including, the policy 
recommendations themselves, the individuals advocating for or against the recommendations, the 
larger environment in existence when the recommendations are presented for consideration, and 
how any organizational restructures those affected would be received and how they would impact 
day-to-day operations. 
As each one of these components is explored, this study expects to find that influential 
individuals directly involved in the possible restructures had a tremendous impact on their actual 
outcomes. These influential individuals and organizations sped up or slowed down 
recommendations and reform process in accordance with their personal agendas. This behavior 
created severe complications for the much needed reform processes. Additionally, this paper 
discusses how the national security and defense establishment in the United States allowed a shift in 
power to occur—transferring significant control from the legislative branch to the executive branch. 
Specifically, the research will focus on how the President’s role and interaction with Congress 
increased drastically and how Presidential power now directly influences issues and legislation more 
than any other time in history.
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The transformation of any aspect of government takes a comprehensive understanding of the 
structure at hand, the power, influence, and desire to make the necessary sweeping changes, and the 
opportunity to justify why the timing is optimal for governmental reform. There are three 
components to understanding the basis and justification behind the need for and subsequent 
restructuring of national security and defense policy: first, understanding how an individual might 
obtain, have, and use power and influence over situations; second, how governmental organizations 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
- 5 - 
exert influence and conduct internal reform; and finally, understand how policy windows are created 
and their intricate role in the reformation of policy. 
Powerful Individuals and their Influence 
There are individuals who are not part of the masses of society, the power elite, but nonetheless 
these power elite represent the wills of the masses. The power an individual has is often represented 
by class status. Many of the powerful elite find influence and power based on their socioeconomic 
placement in society; however, that is not the only area where individuals receive influence.16 
Individuals might find themselves divided into other statuses, such as status within a family, religious 
institution, or school.17 According to C. Wright Mills, those individuals are “the power elite.”18 Mills 
writes: 
The power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary 
environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having 
major consequences. Whether they do or do not make such decisions is less important than 
the fact that they do occupy such pivotal positions: their failure to act, their failure to make 
decisions, is itself an act that is often of greater consequence than the decisions they do 
make. For they are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern 
society. They rule the big corporations. They run the machinery of the state and claim its 
prerogatives. They direct the military establishment.19 
The power elite theory is based on individuals and organizations holding significant power over an 
entity. This individual, or group of individuals, does rely upon others for guidance and support. Mills 
writes that these “advisors and consultants, spokesmen and opinion-makers are often the captains” 
of complex ideas for the ultimate decision-makers.20 These individuals also make up the power elite 
since they have direct access to the final decision-makers that are found among power elite. 
                                                 
16 Mills, C. Wright, The Power Elite (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 3. 
17 Mills, The Power Elite, 6. While it is possible to mean all education, Mills refers explicitly to collegiate education, 
not primary or secondary education. 
18 Mills, The Power Elite, 3. 
19 Mills, The Power Elite, 3–4. 
20 Mills, The Power Elite, 4. 
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According to Mills, members of the power elite represent the driving force behind nearly all major 
issues within a society.21 
It is impossible for a society to function without the power elite group. “The higher circles in 
and around these [societies] are often thought of in terms of what their members possess,” Mills 
explains, “they have a greater share than other people of the things and experiences that are most 
highly valued.”22 President Truman commissioning the Eberstadt Report, a recommendation to 
restructure the Department of Defense, demonstrates these types of experiences.23 Whether right or 
wrong, the knowledge and experience held by a small portion of the population is coveted by society 
at-large; as a result, they shape policy decisions throughout many aspects of a society.24 Typically, 
individuals and organizations that represent the power elite are “atop [the] social stratum,” and, as 
Mills states, comprise “a set of groups whose members know one another, see one another socially 
and at business, and so, in making decisions, take one another into account.”25 These individuals and 
organizations explore reforms at a macro level; making significant reforms that might have 
otherwise not occurred. 
Given the power individuals of this status possess, the influence they wield over any number of 
areas in a society is immense. Their decisions have wide effects on those who are not a member of 
the power elite class. Decisions are made and debated based on the differing of original opinions by 
two or more members of the power elite.26 It is assumed that members of the power elite are 
rational individuals, capable of making significant and quick decisions. In order to come to a 
                                                 
21 Mills, The Power Elite, 4. 
22 Mills, The Power Elite, 9. 
23 U.S. Congress, “Unification of War and Navy Departments.” 
24 Mills, The Power Elite, 6. 
25 Mills, The Power Elite, 11. 
26 Dahl, Robert A., “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model,” The American Political Science Review 52 no. 2 (1958), 464. 
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compromise among differing opinions, the amount of influence a member has, and is willing to 
exert on an issue, plays a pivotal role in the decision-making process. 27 
For the decision-making process, influence acted as part of the power model for the shift in 
national security policy in the United States. Robert A. Dahl outlines three components of influence: 
“differences in the distribution of political resources,”28 “variations in the skill or efficiency with 
which individuals use their political resources,”29 and “variations in the extent to which individuals 
use their resources for political purposes.”30 Depending on an individual’s level of influence and the 
way an individual may wield that influence will dictate one’s overall successes. These successes 
working with other members of the power elite are based upon the relationships and structures of 
the organizations that the power elite oversee.31 
As each one of these influential decision-makers works to make necessary reforms, these players 
must understand the workings of their colleagues and counterparts. In order to do so, these 
powerful individuals must remain neutral to understand what each other player in the scenario is 
doing. This type of behavior directly correlates to Foucault’s Panopticon theory. Those who are 
centrally positioned are able to influence situations easier because, as Foucault explains, “it is 
possible to intervene at any moment and because the constant pressure acts even before the 
                                                 
27 Stone, Deborah, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, revised edition, (New York: W. W . Norton & 
Company, 2002), 233. Stone explains rational decision making as “someone—an individual, a firm, an organization, or 
any entity capable of making a decision—who must choose a course of action in order to attain a desired end.” There 
are four steps that someone must go through to come to a conclusive decision. First, define the specific goals; second, 
imagine alternative means of obtaining said goals; third, evaluate the consequences on each course of action; and fourth, 
choose the best alternative that yields the best potential for attaining the goal. 
28 Dahl, Robert A., Modern Political Analysis: 5th Edition (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1991), 35. The 
full definition reads: “Differences in the distribution of political resources. A political resource is a means by which one 
person can influence the behavior of other persons. Political resources therefore include money, information, food, the 
threat of force, jobs, friendship, social standing, the right to make laws, votes, and great variety of other things.” 
29 Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, 35. The full definition reads: “Variations in the skill or efficiency with which 
individuals use their political” resources. Differences in political skill stem in turn from differences in endowments, 
opportunities, and incentives to learn and practice political skills.” 
30 Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, 35–36. The full definition reads: “variations in the extent to which individuals use 
their resources for political purposes. Of two equally wealthy people, for example, one may use her wealth to gain 
influence while another may use his to achieve success in business. These variations are themselves traceable to 
differences in motivation that arise out of variation in endowments and experiences.” 
31 Mills, The Power Elite, 19. 
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offences, mistakes or crimes have been committed.”32 Before power shifted to the executive branch, 
legislators were at the center of reform policy, allowing them the ability to intervene as necessary. 
However, once central power shifted to the executive, the legislator’s ability was drastically reduced. 
“The panoptic mechanism,” as Foucault explains, “is not simply a hinge, a point of exchange 
between a mechanism of power and a function; it is a way of making power relations function, and 
of making a function function through these power relations.”33 The legislative and executive 
branches are able to not only function independently as power relations, but also work as a cohesive 
functioning unit within the overall governmental structure. The relationship between the two 
branches is a very dynamic relationship—changing depending on the situation. 
Governmental structures in the US, such as the military establishment, the executive branch as a 
whole, or Congress, demonstrate how the power elite theory exists and is an effective method of 
management. Below the power elite level, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz articulate another 
dimension of power. To Bachrach and Baratz, power exists at the power elite level but also “when A 
devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices 
that limits the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are 
comparatively innocuous to A.”34 Members and captains of the power elite use these more indirect 
tactics, in addition to the direct tactics, to focus their personal agenda and direct policy reform as 
they see fit. Secretary Forrestal used Ferdinand Eberstadt as a captain to not only compile his 
recommendations, but also infiltrate those concepts into mainstream discussions among the power 
elite, resulting in successfully staving off collaboration with the War Department until 1949.  
Power, as described thus far, and for the use within the exploration of the reformation of 
national security and defense policy, deals solely with how the power elites interact with one another 
                                                 
32 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 206. 
33 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 206–207. 
34 Bachrach, Peter and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” The American Political Science Review 56, no. 4 (1962), 
948. “A” refers to a specific individual or organization that is working within political forces. 
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to reform an identified problem. Steven Lukes, offers an opposing point of view, refuting aspects of 
the power elite model, explaining “the bias of the system is not sustained simply by a series of 
individually chosen acts, but also, most importantly, by the socially structured and culturally 
patterned behaviour of groups, and practices of institutions, which may indeed be manifested by 
individuals’ inaction.”35 Above individual legislators and executives is the overarching institution that 
collectively can advance or stall recommendations.  
In the beginning of the evolution of national security and defense policy reform, Congressional 
leaders, such as Senator David Walsh (D-MA), Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs and 
Senator Byron Patton “Pat” Harrison (D-MS), a member of the Joint Committee on Reorganization, 
utilized their positions within the institution to stall the consolidation. Though Presidents might 
have wished to consolidate military departments into the Department of Defense—such as 
President Harding’s attempted to in 1924—that was a far off dream.36 Cabinet secretaries, such as 
Navy Secretary James Forrestal in 1945, did not feel that the time was right to consolidate the Navy 
and War Departments into a single Department of Defense.37 Without the institutional power each 
of these individuals held, their attempt at blocking policy windows pertaining to national security 
and defense policy reform could have proven difficult or impossible. 
Governmental Roles 
The fundamentals of creating and shifting policy in the United States are nested in the legislative 
and executive branches of government. On principle, the roles have been clear—the legislative 
constructs and shapes the policy and executive implements and enforces the new policy as 
necessary. Specifically, the Constitution gives Congress the authority “to make all laws which shall 
                                                 
35 Lukes, Steven, Power: A Radical View, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 26. 
36 U.S. Congress, “Reorganization of the Executive Departments,” Report of the Joint Committee on 
Reorganization, 68th Congress, (Washington, D.C. 3 June 1924). 
37 U.S. Congress, “Unification of War and Navy Departments.” 
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be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing power, and all other powers 
vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer 
thereof.”38 The President then has the authority to sign or veto legislation approved by both Houses 
of Congress39 as well as the authority to appoint officers to executive posts as the President sees fit.40 
As in the rest of the Constitution, these powers and responsibilities were intentionally left open for 
interpretation. 
Nowhere does the Constitution specifically outline the president’s role in authoring legislation 
for Congress to pass.41 Presidents through the 1930s almost solely relied on legislators to write 
legislation, even on matters recommended by the president as matters pertinent to the country.42 
Not until President Franklin D. Roosevelt was the role of legislator-in-chief established as part of 
the unofficial job description of the president.43 This new presidential role and expansion of power 
for the president also transformed the way the institution of the president works. The reform of 
national security and defense policy in the United States occurred right as the increase of presidential 
power, including the president’s role pertaining to legislation, was unfolding. 
Though the power of the president has increased over time, it has not eliminated the role of the 
legislator. Legislators, who work their agendas through this process, using any means, are known as 
legislative entrepreneurs.44 There are two distinct parts to the definition of legislative 
entrepreneurship. The first component, as John Kingdon explains, are entrepreneurs that are 
“willing to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, money—to promote a position in return 
                                                 
38 U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 18. 
39 U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 7, cl. 2. 
40 U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2, cl. 2. 
41 Edwards, George C. III and Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making, Second Edition (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 346. 
42 Edwards and Wayne, Presidential Leadership, 347. 
43 Edwards and Wayne, Presidential Leadership, 347. 
44 Wawro, Gregory, Legislative Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House of Representatives, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of 
Michigan Press, 2000), 3. 
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for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits.”45 This definition 
is rather limited as it pertains to individual actors looking to advance their personal agenda, rather 
than working with others as a collective process. The second definition includes legislators who are 
accustomed to working in groups to fortify their position. Those who work the legislative process 
collectively are known as political entrepreneurs.46 Political entrepreneurship is, as Gregory Wawro 
notes, a “mechanism for the pooling of resources so that individuals can act effectively as a group 
and supply themselves with collective goods.”47 Collectively, these two definitions address legislative 
entrepreneurship as it is today. As a result, Wawro defines legislative entrepreneurship as “a set of 
activities that a legislator engages in, which involves working to form coalitions of other members 
for the purpose of passing legislation by combining various legislative inputs and issues in order to 
affect legislative outcomes.”48 
The notion of legislative entrepreneurship changed the entire legislative process. The primary 
goal of legislative entrepreneurs is to, as Wawro describes, “gather enough votes to pass legislation 
(or at least to make credible threats of passing it.) In order to pass legislations, [legislative 
entrepreneurs] must convince a majority in the chamber as well as other key players involved in the 
legislative process that the [legislative entrepreneurs’] proposals will benefit them.”49 In order to pass 
legislation successfully, there are four components legislative entrepreneurs must work through: 
information acquisition, drafting legislation, building coalitions and pushing legislation through.50 
Each of these steps helps the legislative entrepreneur build support for their legislation bettering the 
chance for success. 
                                                 
45 Kingdon, John W., Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: Longman, 2003), 179. 
46 Wawro, Legislative Entrepreneurship, 4. 
47 Wawro, Legislative Entrepreneurship, 4.  
48 Wawro, Legislative Entrepreneurship, 4. 
49 Wawro, Legislative Entrepreneurship, 5. 
50 Wawro, Legislative Entrepreneurship, 5. 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
- 12 - 
Given that the executive’s power has increased to include legislative responsibilities, legislative 
entrepreneurs must adapt to their new working environment. Legislative entrepreneurs now not only 
have to work to gain the support of their colleagues, but also have to work to thwart any presidential 
legislation if it is contradictory to their agenda. When reorganization of the executive branch 
occurred in 1924, only a portion of President Harding’s recommendations were implemented51—
compared to recent presidencies where their recommendations have been granted more weight.52  
Part of the need for the president to present policy recommendations in the form of draft 
legislation is due to the fact that the resources the president has at his disposal far surpasses those 
available to Congress.53 The budget appropriation (all the dollar amounts have been translated into 
2008 dollars for comparison) for the entire legislative branch in 1941 was $356.7 million,54 compared 
to the State Department with appropriations at $273.06 million,55 the War Department with $1.086 
billion,56 or the Navy Department with $13.11 billion.57 The vast majority of the federal budget is 
allocated to the executive branch to execute the laws enacted by the legislative branch. In order to 
successfully conduct day-to-day functions, executive departments need substantially more funding 
and resources than the legislative—hence executive departments are more qualified meeting policy 
goals.  
                                                 
51 U.S. Congress, “Reorganization of the Executive Departments.” 
52 Edwards and Wayne, Presidential Leadership, 285.  
53 Edwards and Wayne, Presidential Leadership, 286–287. Even with substantial increase in resources and additional 
departments, the executive branch still has significantly more access to experts in virtually any field. The executive 
branch is responsible for employing experts within the departments to address issues. These experts then may be called 
upon to provide expert recommendations for policy proposals. Due to the nature of the legislative branch, the staff 
members hired for advisory positions are prone to possess more generalized experience on a multitude of topics. 
54 U.S. Congress, “The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1941,” 77th 
Congress, (Washington, D.C. 1940), A21–A22. The appropriations bill called for $24,611,708 and the figure was 
converted to 2008 dollars. 
55 U.S. Congress, “The 1941 Budget,” 77th Congress, (Washington, D.C. 1940), A70. The appropriations bill called 
for $18,841,006 and the figure was converted to 2008 pre-financial collapse dollars. 
56 U.S. Congress, “The 1941 Budget,” 77th Congress, (Washington, D.C. 1940), A70. The appropriations bill called 
for $746,652,137 and the figure was converted to 2008 pre-financial collapse dollars. 
57 U.S. Congress, “The 1941 Budget,” 77th Congress, (Washington, D.C. 1940), A70. The appropriations bill called 
for $904,540,037 and the figure was converted to 2008 pre-financial collapse dollars. 
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With the significant resources the president had at his disposal, policy recommendations and 
analyses were more accurate and specific than those from the understaffed legislative branch.58 Since 
the president is the chief executive of the executive branch, it makes even more sense for the 
executive to be the architect of the needed and desired reforms, rather than having Congress, which 
has no part of implementation, draft the plan.59 As one chairman of a prominent House committee 
chastised an Eisenhower Administration witness; exclaiming, “Don’t expect us to start from scratch 
on what you people want. That’s not the way we do things here—you draft the bills and we work 
them over.”60 For the reforms of national security and defense policy, “when the War and Navy 
Departments were brought to agreement under the President’s leadership, [Congress] had little 
reason or disposition to oppose, and much to support, legislation to make the compromise 
effective.”61 This does not remove Congress from the entire process. It does work, however, to 
streamline the initial drafting process, resulting, ultimately, in a stronger final piece of legislation.  
Policy Reform 
The evolutionary practices of policymaking consisted of a long and slow process—often taking 
multiple years, and sometimes multiple administrations, to complete.62 These policies range widely 
depending on the scope of the matter they are addressing and can encompass multiple disciplines 
including socioeconomic, military, or procedural. Government programs deal with and reform a 
specific issue, often one or two items at a time. A policy encompasses a much wider scope and can 
include several programs of the same topic within one policy reform. The term policy has been used 
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to describe the work of programs so it is important to differentiate between the two.63 With both 
policy reforms and programs, factors such as the national mood or political party power changes 
help dictate the direction in which policy change occurs.64  
John Kingdon outlines a theoretical model for policy formation with three components and 
processes: “problems, policies and politics.”65 Each of these components feeds upon another, based 
on the original problem, and are designed to channel energy to bring the best solution for a problem 
to fruition. Often times, as is the case with the creation and restructure of national security policy in 
the United States, this process resembles a pinball game. The identification of the problem in 
question is the first and most obvious step of the three. This model has the potential to be used for 
small analyses such as procedural changes, or substantially larger analyses such as governmental 
reorganization. Problems that need to be addressed can manifest themselves in a variety of ways, 
including, as Kingdon describes, “a disaster, crisis, personal experience, or powerful symbol.”66 Once 
the problem itself has been identified, it is then reliant upon those power elites to elevate the 
problem to a status where the problem can be addressed, debated, and reformed. 
From originally identifying the need to strengthen national security and defense policy to final 
unification with the creation of the Department of Defense, several policy windows were created. 
The creation of policy windows pertaining to national security and defense policy were created for 
one of two reasons. The first policy window was created to bolster tighter military collaboration. 
The second opportunity was as other departmental reorganization within the executive branch was 
occurring; addressing the need for military unification could be a possibility. For any of the policy 
windows created, there continued to be a panoptic effect between those members of the power elite 
who were pro-reorganization and anti-reorganization. For each window, whoever was successfully 
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positioned centered during the reform process often was victorious at passing or blocking the 
legislation. 
Agreeing with Mills’ notion, Kingdon articulates that the power elites and those with influence, 
who are able to sway the agenda depending on their opinion, also dictate the project’s momentum.67 
At the same time however, the power elites are not necessarily able to address the needs of the 
problem in need of reform.68 The power elites’ view on a project often pertains more to the macro 
completion and implementation as a whole. Specialists within the field work behind the scenes to 
address the micro particulars of the project and present their findings and any alternatives needed to 
the power elite in order to continue the policy reform process.69  
It is important to note that the specialists making revisions and changes to the recommendations 
and wants of the power elite are also members of the power elite class themselves. In order for the 
power elite to make informed decisions, Mills explains, “advisers and consultants, spokesmen and 
opinion-makers are often the captains of their higher thought and decision.”70 Though Mills 
classifies professional politicians and lobbyists as a group just below the captains, these individuals 
and organizations are also represent the power elites, and do so at a level higher than Mills gives 
them credit.71 These individuals have direct access to the highest members of the power elite class; 
hence, they are power elites by access. 
This reform process between the power elites and the specialists behind the scenes represents a 
pinball effect. This is known as a “policy stream” where ideas in their infancy will “float around, 
bumping into one another, encountering new ideas, and forming combinations and 
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recombinations.”72 As these ideals and recommendations develop from infancy on a variety of 
issues, power elites must be willing to utilize some of their influence in order to make these come to 
fruition.73 Depending on the size and drive of the issue, the ways in which it can finalize itself differ. 
The larger the policy reform, the smaller the opportunity for it to be effectively completed, rather 
than a watered-down version of the policy reform. These opportunities are “policy windows.”74 A 
policy window is when an opportunity presents itself through a problem or political shift.75 These 
windows are few and far between; when they present themselves, numerous policy reforms can be 
pushed through, making the influence and power elite a critical player to ensure a reform’s success.76 
METHODOLOGY 
One of the primary methods in political science for in-depth analysis is the use of case studies. 
There are three different types of case studies, explanatory, descriptive, and exploratory. Each type 
of case study can comprise either single or multiple cases to examine the topic.77 Case studies “are 
the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed.”78 Explanatory case studies, 
Robert Yin explains, “present data bearing on cause-effect relationship—explaining which causes 
produced which effects.”79 In order to explain the transformation of national security and defense 
policy in the United States effectively, an explanatory case will be employed to understand the policy 
shift. First started in 1916, the reform process did not move directly into its final form; rather, it 
took several smaller recommendations and policy implementations before the final reform—the 
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National Security Act Amendments of 1949—brought solutions to the problem.80 The single 
explanatory case study method will be utilized to outline how the national security and defense 
policy reform took place and why it was vital to national interest that the reform occurred. Within 
the single case study analyzing the overall reform process, from the initial problem identification in 
1916 to the comprehensive solution and enactment of the Department of Defense in 1949, 
numerous recommendations and failed policy implementations took place. 
Incorporating theoretical frameworks into the case study allows “a researcher to achieve high[er] 
levels of conceptual validity.”81 Since “many of the variables that interest social scientists, such as 
democracy, power, political culture, state strength, and so on are notoriously difficult to measure,” 
using the case study method allows for deeper “contextualized comparison.”82 Contextualized 
comparison is designed to “address the issue of equivalence by searching for analytically equivalent 
phenomena—even if expressed in substantively different terms—across different context.”83 This 
type of contextualized comparison directly allows for the examination of different frameworks 
simultaneously. Given the complexity of reforming national security and defense policy, to 
understand each of the components throughout the process, several theoretical frameworks—
including power, policy-reform models and executive privilege—will be utilized and explored 
through contextual comparison to allow for better comprehension. 
Explanatory case studies specifically are heavily reliant upon historical accounts and analysis to 
decipher the thought processes during a particular study. These historical studies are based upon 
“primary documents, secondary documents, and cultural and physical artifacts as the main sources 
of evidence” since information from those who were involved or were witness to the actions are not 
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available.84 While a strict historical analysis of events can lead to successful conclusions, “case studies 
and histories can overlap” and case studies have the “ability to deal with a full variety of evidence—
documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations—beyond what might be available in the 
conventional historical study.”85 To analyze the national security and defense policy reform in the 
United States successfully, the single case study will look at each of the failed recommendations and 
policy implementations that took place from the initial identification of the problem to the final 
outcome. Though individually they may have failed to correct the problem, each attempt may have 
either helped or hindered the overall movement for a need for reform. Both a case study analysis 
and a historical analysis will provide insight into the mood of a particular time, allowing for better 
understanding of the recommendations put forth—and their respective successes and failures. 
Given the historical nature and the overall complexity of the national security and defense policy 
reform, the single explanatory case study will encompass all the necessary components to 
understand the policy reform’s importance thoroughly and effectively. 
NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM 
The United States identified the need to reform its national security and defense policy as far 
back as 1916 with the National Defense Act and its creation of the Council of National Defense.86 
Concerns regarding national security and defense policy had been, according to John Millett, 
“sporadic, alternating between short periods of intense concern and longer periods of general 
indifference.”87 The Council of National Defense did not address many of the concerns regarding 
the overarching need for stronger communications between the State, War, and Navy Departments. 
Stronger communication, unification, and collaboration between the three departments would not 
                                                 
84 Yin, Case Study Research, 8. 
85 Yin, Case Study Research, 8. 
86 Hammond, “Device for Interdepartmental Coordination,” 899.  
87 Millett, John D., “National Defense and Democratic Society: A Symposium,” American Political Science Review 43, 
no. 3 (1949), 524. 
 NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM 
- 19 - 
come until thirty-three years later with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and the 
National Security Act Amendments of 1949. Each one of these possible reform opportunities 
presented itself as a policy window generated by either the need for tighter military collaboration or 
other executive department reorganization where military unification could also have easily been 
addressed.  
Prior to the consolidation of the different military departments, each military branch was 
independent from the others. All actions and decisions within the War Department were separate 
from those made by the Navy Department. As the United States continued to play more of a role on 
the international stage, and cooperation among the executive departments was critical to that 
success, the need for unification became imminent.88 In order to make that unification a reality, 
numerous individuals—such as Senator David Walsh (D-MA), Chairman of the Committee on Naval 
Affairs, James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, Senator Byron Patton “Pat” Harrison (D-MS), and 
President Harry Truman—invested considerable time and political capital to sway the unification of 
these two departments. As time passed, the individuals who were responsible for the actual reform 
process shifted from legislative to the executive, illustrating the shift in power between the two. 
The idea for unifying military forces is not unique to the United States or to the National 
Security Act. The idea of managing national security and military forces by committee is traced back 
to Great Britain and the Esher Committee recommendations of 1904. It recommended the creation 
of the Committee of Imperial Defense (CID), which served as the unified British military 
establishment.89 The reforms of the CID in 1904 reformed British military organization in four 
primary ways:  
(1) Its chief distinguishing element was a record-keeping secretariat, headed by a secretary having 
the power of initiative, of reminding the Prime Minister of his responsibilities for strategic 
planning and decision-making. (2) Membership (including that of the Dominions) was flexible, 
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being appointed by the Prime Minister to his advisory committee, not to a cabinet committee. (3) 
A conscious effort was here made to relate the service departments to such other vital 
departments as the Exchequer, the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, and, later, the India 
Office, in a modernized form of “inner cabinet.” (4) The new arrangements confirmed the 
politicians and the professional service leaders alike as full members of this consultative and 
planning organization.”90 
While not a perfect system upon conception and implementation, the CID worked to unify and 
gather information as it pertained to British security. Subcommittees within the CID worked on 
important aspects of British defense including, a strong navy, assessing possible invasion threats, and 
ensuring the security of India.91 
Due to numerous factors, including political influence and timing, the British theories would not 
be practiced in the United States until many years later. There were numerous boards, organizations, 
councils, and committees formed during the thirty-three year period between the identification of 
the need for reform and final rectification of national security and defense policy reform. True 
reform did not occur until 1949 with the National Security Act Amendments, creating the 
Department of Defense as we know it today. This study will not look at every organization founded 
during that time to explain the reform process, but rather at the significant organizations and reform 
attempts over time. In order to do so, this study will explore shifts of the power among both 
individuals and governmental branches, as well as how policy windows are generated and in turn 
direct the reform process. 
The Conception Period (1916–1941) 
The United States emerged as a world power, militarily and economically, in 1898. Prior to 1898, 
the United States did not have the need for a large military presence, given its tranquil relationship 
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with many European countries.92 Upon becoming a major international power, the United States was 
still not fully equipped to address foreign policy issues, including ignoring many aspects of national 
security and defense policy.93 During the conception period, two policy windows presented 
themselves, 1916 and 1924, providing an opportunity to unify and strengthen national security and 
defense policy. Substantive reform did not manifest during these times due to the power differential 
between the executive and legislative branches.94  
The first policy window, which began the entire reform process, was the National Defense Act 
of 1916 and the creation of the Council of National Defense. This Act created only a partial policy 
window. The sole change that the National Defense Act accomplishes is more clearly defining the 
role of the United States Army, nothing pertaining to the Navy.95 The Act creates or provides 
clarification for the organization of traditional Army, Army Reserves, and the Military Academy, and 
defines all components related to running the Department of War.96 These additional resources and 
newly defined organizations were intended to provide needed resources to help with national 
security and national defense.  
Knowing full well that coordination between the departments was needed in order to 
successfully lead the United States into modern military practices’ President Woodrow Wilson took 
the opportunity to move on the necessary reforms. Following World War I, there would have been 
the opportunity for a possible policy window, giving the United States government the 
understanding and justification for a unified military, the new structure would provide a much 
greater service than the 19th century fragmented military operations. Unfortunately, those decision-
makers central to the reform process did not feel unification was necessary.  
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Joint Committee on Reorganization of the Executive Departments 
Created by joint resolution in 1921, amended in 1923, the Joint Committee on Reorganization 
had two responsibilities: “first, what redistribution of work should be made among Government 
agencies, spoken of as services; and, second, what regrouping of the services themselves should be 
made among the departments.”97 This reorganization presented a policy window to unify the military 
establishment while reorganizing other components of the executive branch. Though this task was 
traditionally entrusted solely to Congress, a hand was extended to the executive branch, allowing 
President Warren Harding to designate a representative to serve on the committee as a liaison. The 
President’s designee then served as chairman of the committee.98 This type of courtesy, extended to 
the executive branch from Congress, demonstrates the need to include the ideas and notions of the 
president, rather than excluding them.  
The Joint Committee gathered information from two sources—joint committee hearings and 
President Harding’s recommendation. Appearing before the committee was every cabinet secretary, 
as well as numerous of bureau officers and members involved with private organizations to discuss 
the advantages and disadvantages of reorganization.99 In addition to testimony, the committee 
reviewed President Harding’s recommendation.  
Harding’s recommendations were submitted to the committee on 13 February 1923. Harding’s 
recommendations include creating the Department of National Defense, which would unify the 
military and naval establishments, as well as transfer all nonmilitary functions out of the War and 
Navy Departments, allowing them to focus directly primarily on military functions, rather than other 
                                                 
97 U.S. Congress, “Reorganization of the Executive Departments,” 11. 
98 U.S. Congress, “Reorganization of the Executive Departments,” 1. 
99 U.S. Congress, “Reorganization of the Executive Departments,” 2. The only cabinet officer not to testify was the 
Secretary of State whose department had little involvement in the executive reorganization. The hearings concluded 
April 8, 1924. 
 NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM 
- 23 - 
duties.100 Harding felt unification was one of the most important reorganizations the committee 
should consider during its deliberations.101 Harding, however, explains that the reason for the delay 
of the recommendations to the committee was “cased solely by the difficulty which has been 
encountered in reconciling the views of the various persons charged with the responsibility of 
administering the executive branch of government.”102 Harding outright admits in his cover letter 
that other members of the power elite, his cabinet secretaries and agency directors, drove the 
discussion of reorganization, undermining Harding’s power and authority. Within the executive 
structure, the centers of power included were among the President and his cabinet, rather than just 
the President. 
The committee reviewed the President’s well-thought-out recommendation; however, it only 
took a portion of President Harding’s recommendation, rather than fully implementing it.103 
Allowing the President to have recommendations about the reorganization of the executive 
demonstrates the beginning of shift in power and influence from Congressional leaders to the 
President. 
When the subsequent legislation and final recommendations were made for reorganization of 
executive departments, the unification of the War and Navy Departments was omitted.104 The 
committee explained that “due to a variety of reasons, however, the committee, after a careful 
consideration of the many aspects of its problem, was unable to concur in all the suggestions coming 
from the Chief Executive.”105 A supplemental report from Pat Harrison (D-MS) and R. Walton 
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Moore (D-VA), explains “many of the suggestions that were submitted to the committee by President 
Harding, as for instance that of consolidation the War and Navy Departments, have been rejected 
because of conflicting views of Cabinet officials.”106 While the committee might have felt the 
recommendations were valid, the dissension in the ranks between certain cabinet officials led the 
committee to believe that unification of the War and Navy Departments would be inappropriate at 
this time. As a result, the cabinet officials proved to be at the panoptic center of power, and 
manipulating the power elite to their agenda.107 
The Birth Period (1941–1949) 
World War II demonstrated to the United States Government that its military and political 
establishments were lagging in preparedness.108 Several aspects of World War II in both the 
European and Asian theatres demonstrate a lack of unified policy goals unification among 
governmental departments. For instance, some plans for the European theatre were considered so 
secret by high-ranking military officers, that the plans were withheld from the State Department 
until the evening prior to the war beginning in Europe.109 The Asian theatre opened the political and 
intelligence failures, followed with difficulties of manpower and coalitions.110 Each policy window 
created during this period resulted from the need for tighter military collaboration. The four 
significant reforms that would evolve during this policy window were: the State-War-Navy 
Coordinating Committee, the Eberstadt Report, the National Security Act of 1947, and the National 
Security Act Amendments of 1949. Each one of these presented a slightly different recommendation 
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than its predecessor, building upon prior successes and failures. No one specific reform during this 
period wholly addressed the need for unification. 
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee 
One of the largest steps taken to unify and assist in coordination between the three national 
security departments came as World War II was ending. In 1944, the State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee (SWNCC), later renamed the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee 
(SANACC), was established.111 Prior to the creation of the Coordinating Committee, Harold Mosley, 
Charles McCarthy and Alvin Richardson explained the “lack of coordination between the State, War, 
and Navy Departments has been a rather common theme.”112 The creation of the Coordinating 
Committee arose from a secret executive decision in the final year of World War II as a result of the 
need for tighter military collaboration. The committee was established, as Moseley, McCarthy, and 
Richardson noted, “as the result of an exchange of letters between the Secretaries of State, War and 
Navy Departments” to ensure information was shared between the departments where a common 
interest existed.113 The policy window was opened by the need for a better flow of information 
during World War II and was successfully executed for two reasons. First, the committee did not 
require congressional approval, thus centralizing the decision-making process with the executive. 
Next, all three department secretaries agreed on the need, so the power struggles were reduced. 
The Coordinating Committee consisted of assistant secretaries who worked on current World 
War II policies and plans, as well as addressed questions pertaining to post-war policies.114 The 
creation of the Coordinating Committee turned out to be important, as it would end up being a 
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direct ancestor of the National Security Council. The Coordinating Committee fostered 
communication and collaboration between the three separate military departments, as well as other 
departments with ties to national security and defense policy.115 Given, however, that the committee 
was created without using any Congressional means, it did not restructure the national security and 
defense policy establishment enough to make the needed difference. 
The Coordinating Committee worked on both political and military responses as modern day 
warfare evolved, though it was not the original intent of the organization.116 The SWNCC was 
intended to serve as a way for the State Department to gather information from the War and Navy 
Departments regarding possible political ramifications of military situations. That dynamic would 
later change and the SWNCC would provide all three departments with valuable information.117 While 
the Committee did work on numerous policies with broad reaching topics, it fell short on two 
fronts—the ability to shape and make policy as well as the way its assignments were gathered. If 
cabinet secretaries served on the committee rather than assistant secretaries (i.e. decision making 
members of the power elite rather than captains to the power elite decision-makers) the committee’s 
ability to respond and act swiftly when necessary could have been increased.118  
The Committee was only granted permission to work on assignments from the cabinet 
department secretaries. Numerous times plans were presented to the President from his cabinet level 
department heads with no consideration or input on feasibility given from the Coordinating 
Committee. As a result, the military may or may not have been able to make good on the promises 
of execution presented to the President.119 The idea of the Coordinating Committee was a reasonable 
one conceptually; however practical implementation fell short of adequately addressing the needs of 
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national security and defense policy given its lack of influence. The type of reform needed would 
give broad-reaching powers to the heads of the department, allow them to review all decisions and 
make the needed policy recommendations and decisions, based on the best information. 
The Eberstadt Report 
Following World War II, the United States finally began to take seriously how to reform and 
streamline national security and defense policy. The most comprehensive report addressing the need 
to undertake national security and defense policy reform is known as the Eberstadt Report.120 
Commissioned by Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, Ferdinand Eberstadt was asked to provide 
recommendations on three matters: 
1. Would unification of the War and Navy Departments under a single head improve our 
national security? 
2. If not, what changes in the present relationships of the military services and departments 
has our war experience indicated as desirable to improve our national security? 
3. What forms of postwar organization should be established and maintained to enable the 
military services and other Government departments and agencies most effectively to 
provide for and protect our national security?121 
Eberstadt would later address each of these questions before outlining twelve recommendations 
regarding how to best address the ailing system and bring about reform. 
President Truman and Secretary James Forrestal both realized the need for coordination 
between the different departments. Forrestal called upon Eberstadt to develop recommendations for 
military consolidation that were, coincidentally, released on 15 May 1945, within days of the end of 
the War in Europe. As power elite decision-makers themselves, Forrestal and Eberstadt wielded 
their tremendous power to justify why the Departments of War and Navy should not be 
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consolidated into one department, reporting their findings directly to the President.122 Though 
Forrestal and Eberstadt did not feel the Navy Department should be integrated with the War 
Department, Eberstadt’s recommendation would continue the policy window opportunity, allowing 
for the two to work together through the National Security Act of 1947. 123  
In his initial response to Forrestal, Eberstadt acknowledged the need to address the shortfalls of 
the current military establishment. At the same time however, Eberstadt discredited the notion that a 
single unified department, would not be a reasonable response to unification.124 Rather than 
completely abandoning independent departments, Eberstadt recommended attempting to correct 
any conditions within the current framework that were not effective. As these conditions were 
addressed, it was crucial to understand whether unification would correct these conditions or create 
additional or different issues that would then need to be addressed.125  
Eberstadt argued that it was not the military component falling short on execution and effective 
tactics; rather it was failed coordination at multiple levels.126 Eberstadt explained that there were:  
gaps between foreign and military policy—between the State Department and the Military 
Establishments. Gaps between strategic planning and its logistic implementation—between the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military and civilian agencies responsible for industrial mobilization. 
Gaps between and within the military services—principally in the field of procurement and 
logistics. Gaps in information and intelligence—between the executive and legislative branches 
of our Governments, between the several departments, and between Government and the 
people.127 
These widespread gaps throughout the government and society created faults “due primarily to lack 
of appropriate and seasoned mechanisms and adequate plans, policies, and procedures for 
coordination.”128 Eberstadt contested that the gaps were not solely the fault of the military 
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establishment. It was rather, a collective, overarching failure between multiple departments and 
branches of government, which led to the empowered position the United States government.129  
Eberstadt outlined twelve courses of action to better handle coordination, planning, and 
procedures. The recommendations were: 
1. Organization of the military forces into three coordinate departments; 
2. Creation of a National Security Council; 
3. Continuation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 
4. Creation of a National Security Resources Board; 
5. Creation of a Military Munitions Board; 
6. Study and regrouping of present joint committees; 
7. Encouragement of scientific research and development; 
8. Creation of a Military Education and Training Board; 
9. Creation of a Central Intelligence Agency; 
10. Attainment of maximum symmetry in the administrative structures of the coordinate military 
departments; 
11. The maintenance of close working relations with Congress; 
12. Appointment of a commission to make an over-all study of the problems of national 
security.130 
Eberstadt also included a proposed organizational chart for national security.131 Some of these 
recommendations were implemented under either the National Security Act of 1947 or 1949 while 
others were disregarded. 
Two of the last recommendations from the Eberstadt report dealt with how to effectively 
coordinate the administrative structures of the three military branches and have better relations with 
the legislative branch. Within previous military establishments, the effectiveness has been hampered 
due to the disorganization between the War and Navy Departments. Though the organization was 
understood within one department workings with other departments were often times difficult. The 
concept of creating two departments, to have symmetrical organizational structures, would 
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streamline the organization, including that of military establishment.132 At the same time, this 
symmetry between departments would contribute to better support from Congressional leadership. 
Such support would pay off in several ways, including committee and legislative actions necessary 
for military operations.133 
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 
The executive branch was not the only branch of government that reviewed its structure and 
underwent reorganization during the 1940s. Like the executive branch, the legislative branch took 
many years to make substantive changes to its inner-workings.134 Also, the legislative branch needed 
to change based on, as Roger Davidson articulates, “action[s] to meet constitutional and public 
expectations concerning the general welfare.”135 However, Davidson also notes that Congress differs 
from the executive branch because “political or governmental shifts also drive [its] workload: 
aggressive presidential leadership, partisan realignments, and momentous Supreme Court rulings, 
among other things.”136 In order to keep in tune with changing pressures, Congress reorganized 
many of its responsibilities and internal structures by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. 
The reorganization act accomplished its objective, streamlining the standing committee structure 
in both Houses of Congress. The Act consolidated standing committees by, as George Galloway 
explains, “dropping minor, inactive committees and by merging those with related functions.”137 For 
the House of Representatives, this reduced the number of standing committees from 48 to 19, and 
in the Senate from 33 to 15.138 In both chambers, the Military Affairs and Naval Affairs committees 
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were combined to form the Armed Services committees.139 Carrying the force of law, the 
combination off the two standing committees into the Armed Services committee via the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946 was technically the first legal unification of the national security and 
defense establishment.  
The actions of the legislative branch paralleled the executive branch and were limited with regard 
to overall unification. Combining the two committees only streamlined how oversight from 
Congress would occur—not departmental unification, which would also require action on the 
executive branch’s part. In the same spirit, the attempts by the executive branch to unify the national 
security and defense establishment did not allow for a significant restructure or creation of a single 
department, as they did not have Congressional approval to make those moves. The executive 
branch’s attempts only allowed for collaboration and the understanding from the existing 
departments that partnership and interdepartmental teamwork was necessary. It inevitably took the 
two branches working together, rather than trying to exclude one another, to unify the national 
security and defense establishment in the United States.  
The National Security Act of 1947 
Legislative action was much swifter for the National Security Act of 1947 than it was for 
previous legislation dealing with the same topic. This is directly related to how Congress is now 
using the executive branch’s recommendation, the Eberstadt Report, to write this legislation.140 The 
initial version of the National Security Act was introduced into the Senate as S.758 on 3 March 1947 
and referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee.141 In just five short months, the legislation 
would have worked its way through the legislative process, passing the House with slight 
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modifications on 19 July142 before being approved in Conference Committee five days later on 24 
July.143 The legislation was written in such a way that the Conference Committee only needed to 
adjust minor word choices to suit the needs of the two Houses. Such changes included naming the 
new secretary the “Secretary of Defense” rather than the “Secretary of National Security,” and 
calling the department the “National Military Establishment” rather than the “Department of 
Defense.”144 
The Act entered into effect on 17 September 1947, upon confirmation of James Forrestal as the 
first Secretary of Defense, replacing the Secretary of War. 145 At that point, the newly created 
National Military Establishment took control of military actions in the United States.146 Congress 
passed the National Security Act of 1947 on 26 July 1947, designed to 
promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National 
Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a 
Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the activities of the National 
Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the government concerned 
with the national security.147 
The Act took many of the recommendations from Eberstadt’s report and placed them into 
legislative language, including creating the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the National Security Resources Board, the National Military Establishment, the Secretary 
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development 
Board.148 The complete list of new agencies and reforms is found in Appendix B.  
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Up until the National Security Act, the Eberstadt Report had served merely as a 
recommendation to the President. Once the report was used legislatively, it drastically changed the 
relationship between the executive and the legislative branches. The President now served as a 
legislator rather than just executing decisions made by the legislative branch. At the same time, 
utilizing the Eberstadt Report to construct the National Security Act illustrated how the resources at 
the executive’s disposal were better equipped to make recommendations of this scope and 
magnitude. 
Unlike previous attempts at unification that had been stalled by members of Congress, members 
began to realize and embrace the value of the expertise the different executive departments had to 
offer. Rather than either discrediting or completely dismissing the recommendations of the experts, 
on numerous occasions during debate in both houses of Congress in 1947, members had letters and 
comments from experts, including Dwight D. Eisenhower during his tenure as War Department 
Chief of Staff149 and 1942 testimony from then Senator Harry S. Truman,150 entered into the 
Congressional Record. While Senator Truman was in Congress he knew that reform as needed; 
however, he did not have the necessary power to make the unification a reality. Truman stated that 
“the nation’s safety must have a more solid foundation. An obvious first step is a consolidation of 
the Army and the Navy that will put all of our defensive and offensive strength under one tent.”151 
Truman’s words at the time fell on deaf ears since he did not have the power within the system at 
the time to make the necessary recommendations work. 
Though unbeknownst at the time, it was Truman’s work in the Senate starting 1941 that allowed 
him to rise to power and create the policy window to finally unify the national security and defense 
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establishment in the United States. In an attempt to direct attention to a problem with national 
military policy, Truman called for a special committee to review all defense contracts.152 As a result, 
the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, known as the “Truman 
Committee,” formed for that sole purpose.153 Truman’s role on the committee as chairman, 
however, would elevate him beyond just reviewing defense contracts and include other aspects of 
national security and defense policy. 
At the beginning of this process, many in Washington did not take the Truman Committee 
seriously. For instance, upon creation, all but one of the committee members, Truman included, 
were junior senators.154 Regardless of rank in the Senate, senior members of the War Department 
were concerned with the damage that could be done to their establishment. David McCullough 
noted that “a single nettlesome senator could mean unending problems and bad publicity [for the 
War Department], let alone an ambitious chairman of an investigating committee whose main, 
underlying intent, more than likely, would be to advance his political fortunes.”155 McCullough was 
right; during the three years the committee was in existence, Truman was able to continue to build a 
name for himself and advance his political career to later be nominated as Vice President for the 
1944 Democratic ticket with President Roosevelt.156 From there, Truman’s political career is, as they 
would say, history. 
The passage of the Act came as the result of a policy window, created by President Truman’s 
expanded power and the realization during and following World War II that unification was a must. 
As President, rather than a Senator, even with a committee chairmanship, Truman now had the 
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power and ability to drive the unification and reform movement, seeking to solve a problem 
identified as far back as 1916. Though opportunities presented themselves and recommendations 
were made throughout the thirty-one years leading up to the passage of the Act, nothing substantive 
came to fruition. The recommendations and implemented policies went back and forth, until 
Truman had the power to develop and implement a practical and comprehensive plan.  
Comprehensive plans do not always work the first time around. Since there was no precedence 
for this type of action in United States government history, the probability that the proposed idea 
would be perfect was improbable. Truman worked during the first two years after the act, 1947–49, 
to integrate these new components into the already established advisory group within the 
administration.157 There were still components of the newly created establishment that were not as 
effective as they were desired. This process of integration led to yet another reform for national 
security and defense policy. 
The National Security Act Amendments of 1949 
On 10 August 1949, the amendments to the National Security Act entered into effect—granting 
additional sweeping changes to the National Military Establishment and the Secretary of Defense. 
Initially, the National Security Act of 1947 stipulated that the National Military Establishment did 
not have any authority whatsoever—it served merely as a coordinating agency of the military 
departments.158 Though the National Military Establishment brought all three departments under 
one umbrella, the departments still, under section 202(a) “shall be administered as individual 
executive departments by their respective Secretaries and all powers and duties relating to such 
departments not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense by this Act shall be retained 
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by each of their respective Secretaries.”159 Still concerned with having direct access to the president, 
this gave the service department secretaries the ability to remain a direct chain to the president, 
rather than through an intermediary, such as the Secretary of Defense.  
The Hoover Commission Report on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, chaired by 
former President Herbert Hoover, was released in 1948 and explained how to make the executive 
branch more effective. Congress commissioned the report through Public Law 80-162, requesting 
how to best reorganize the executive branch.160 Congress understood, more so than in previous 
attempts, to consult with the executive branch for recommendations on how the reorganization 
should occur. Though just created a year before the Commission was released, the National Military 
Establish came under fire as an ineffective organization.161 Given that the original Act did not create 
any central authority for the different military branches themselves, only for the overarching 
coordination system itself, it failed to address one of the primary reasons for the Act to further 
solidify the notion of a civilian controlled military.162  
Without civilian control and subsequent oversight, it is impossible for the President and others 
to be accountable to Congress. The Report found three principles had been violated: 
a. The President’s authority has been curtailed by statutory stipulation of the membership and 
duties of both the National Security Council and the National Security Resources Board—
the Cabinet committees concerned with vital defense policies. 
b. The authority of the Secretary of Defense, and hence the control of the President, is weak 
and heavily qualified by the provisions of the act of 1947 which set up a rigid structure of 
federation rather than unification 
c. In direct proportion to the limitations and confusions of authority among their civilian 
superiors, the military are left free of civilian control.163 
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The Secretary of Defense, under the original Act, was only granted limited “general” power over the 
military branches.164 For example, the Secretary only possessed the authority to hire or fire his direct 
staff. The ability to hire and fire those within the services was sheltered and power protected by 
those in the military branches.165 Additionally, the original Act allowed for the service secretaries to 
serve at the same rank and power as the Secretary of Defense on the National Security Council. This 
would allow the service secretaries to overrule the Secretary of Defense on particular issues before 
the Council166 
Given these inequalities within the National Security Act, the Report offered several 
recommendations.167 These recommendations included moving all current authority vested within 
the service departments and secretaries to the Secretary of Defense; removing the power for service 
secretaries to circumvent the authority and decision of the Secretary of Defense; and directing that 
all administrative authority be centered on the Secretary of Defense under the direction of the 
President—not through the service secretaries.168  
The Hoover Commission Report is the second instance in three years in which the President 
continued to expand his powers to include legislative duties. Though commissioned to address the 
inadequacies of the original version of the National Security Act for the President, the Report did 
more than that—it created a policy window for revisions. Since President Truman already had much 
of the support needed to pass the original Act, the revisions, with the Hoover Commission Report’s 
recommendations, would be a relatively easy feat. 
Congress did heckle between the two Houses over some of the minor details of the amended 
Act. To accomplish the reforms needed to increase the power and authority to the Secretary of 
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Defense, the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 made the necessary accommodations. 
Section 201, pertaining to the National Military Establishment now the Department of Defense, was 
revised to read: 
a. There is hereby established, as an Executive Department of the Government, the 
Department of Defense, and the Secretary of Defense shall be the head thereof.  
b. There shall be within the Department of Defense (1) the Department of the Army, the 
Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, and each such 
department shall on and after the date of enactment of the National Security Act 
Amendments of 1949 be military departments in lieu of their prior status as Executive 
Departments, and (2) all other agencies created under title II of this Act.169 
This language removed the ability for the service secretaries to circumvent the Secretary of Defense 
and appeal directly to the President. The amendments to the Act redefined the different levels of the 
power elite and how the military secretaries were forced to work within a new framework. Now, 
rather than working as direct captains of the president, the military secretaries were forced to work 
as captains to the Secretary of Defense, who worked as a captain of the president.170 This 
differentiation of power allowed for better oversight throughout the military establishment. 
As with the initial National Security Act of 1947, Congressional members undertook the 
unification process and began to address how to best meet the needs of the National Military 
Establishment. President Truman continued to share his belief that “the organization of [the] War 
and Navy Departments, prescribed by detailed statutes, was far too rigid and inflexible for the actual 
conduct of war,” hence it needed more fluid policies.171  
The success the President had with passing the previous legislation lent him tremendous power 
to make necessary amendments to the National Military Establishment without facing too much 
opposition. That did not however prevent members of Congress from bloviating in opposition. For 
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instance, Congressman George Mahon, Chairman of the House Appropriations, Subcommittee on 
Defense, disputed that the unification underway of the War and Navy Departments did not go far 
enough. In a speech on the House floor, Mahon stated that “unification often involves the giving up 
of offices and prerogatives which present incumbents have.”172 Mahon went on to state that 
we shall never have unification until West Point and Annapolis have been converted into 
national defense academies. I believe Congress should give serious consideration to such action. 
Personally, I think it ought to be done; and I think all military personnel, as far as that is 
concerned, on shore duty, should be in the same uniform. No such attempt, of course, is being 
made in this bill.173 
That all being said, even with the power that a committee or subcommittee chairman holds within 
the established political process, sometimes that is not enough. President Truman and other 
supporters of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 overcame the objections, creating the 
Department of Defense and National Security Council as it exists today. 
Upon enactment of the amendments to the Act, the policy window that had been created with 
the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the Eberstadt Report closed. Adequate reforms 
and reorganization had taken place for national security and defense policy, leaving no additional 
need for significant reorganization.174 Each president has the authority to edit and manipulate the 
Council and structure of his advisors to meet his needs. While those advisors and preferences for 
how the system works remain fluid, the national security system itself remains constant and 
unchanged from administration to administration.175 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Reforming governmental structure is a daunting task to undertake and effectively execute. 
Executing effectively and expeditiously represents an even more complex undertaking for the 
president and others in power. While the need for national security and defense policy reform 
manifested itself in 1916, the influential individual with the wherewithal to invest the resources and 
expertise to effectively execute the reform process did not come until three decades later.176 During 
those thirty-three years, several opportunities to begin reforming the system presented themselves—
however there was not a sufficiently powerful individual or group of individuals supporting the 
movement to make the reform prospect a reality.177 
Any reform and governmental restructure process, but most especially with as large of 
governmental restructure as was found with the National Security Act of 1947, takes the will a of 
committed and powerful individual to ensure its success. Without this component the reform 
process is bound to fail from the beginning. The other necessary component to bring reform to an 
issue is a policy window, such as the one that finally opened to create the Department of Defense. 
Policy windows can take on different forms depending on the type of reform warranted. Presented 
at the right time, coupled with someone willing to invest the necessary energy and influence to make 
the movement a success, large reorganization and reforms like this study outlines are possible. 
The powers of the president are only as effective as the holder of the office allows them to be. 
Part of the reason for the failed reform process prior to the Truman administration was that prior 
presidents did not have as much power nor the experience with the topic to make reform as 
successful as Truman did. Additionally, any change in the political establishment to remove power 
and direct access to the President from cabinet secretaries, especially the military secretaries, was not 
                                                 
176 Hammond, “National Security Council Coordination,” 899. 
177 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 200. 
 CONCLUSIONS 
- 41 - 
a reasonable solution to the identified national security and defense policy issue.178 Until World War 
II, the secretaries drove the conversation—not the president—about how to handle reforms that is 
why the country was littered with different councils and organizations attempting to address national 
security and defense policy reform without removing power—because the secretaries did not want 
that to happen. Numerous times the policy windows presented themselves, such as following World 
War I and anytime throughout World War II; however, secretaries possessed the power and 
influence to restrict or close policy windows, not allowing reform to occur. Removing half of the 
equation for how reforms occur does not allow it to progress forward.  
Once someone takes over in a position of power and influence who is willing to use influence 
for matters that need addressing, the probability that change is on the horizon, in the event a policy 
window is available and warranted, is highly likely. The failures throughout World War II, with 
unification and adequate cooperation between the military departments, presented the United States 
Legislative and Executive Branches with the opportunity needed to bring the full sweeping reforms. 
That policy window represents one half of the necessary equation for sweeping reforms. The other 
half of the equation is the power and influence from a leader to move it forward. President 
Truman’s leadership and experience as the chairman of the Senate special committee on national 
defense gave him such leadership and influence.179 Both of those traits working together contributed 
to the manifestation of the National Security Act of 1947 and its later amendment in 1949. 
Though rare, policy windows are the preferred method of governmental reorganization. 
National security and defense policy reform is not the only governmental restructure based on a 
policy window. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, another policy window 
presented itself to reorganize coordination efforts within the government. Similar to the events after 
World War I, the United States and other countries did not adequately address security concerns in 
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the post-Cold War era.180 As a result of poor planning, President George W. Bush was quick to act 
to reform and meet the new need to protect homeland security. In under a month, Bush appointed 
Tom Ridge, then governor of Pennsylvania, as a White House coordinator, or czar.181 Traditionally, 
czars did not have power or agencies of their own to make their position effective. White House 
czars in this regard represent the same type of organization dynamic that was found in the initial 
years of national security and defense policy reform—such as the State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee or the National Military Establishment—the intent is present; however, the influence 
and power to make the position effective is not.182 
Bush worked at an accelerated speed compared to the workings of national security reform 
process. Also, Bush worked to ensure that right after conception Ridge would have all of the 
necessary resources to meet the requirements of the changed world. Bush began to set plans and 
recommendations into place that allow Ridge the necessary resources to make his new position a 
success.183 The process employed in this case study, with some modifications as necessary, could be 
implemented to evaluate and analyze the reform and governmental reorganization surrounding the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security. 
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Proposed Organization for National Security184 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
184 U.S. Congress, “Unification of War and Navy Departments,” Facing 6. 
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APPENDIX B 
Table of Contents for the National Security Act of 1947185 
 
Title I—Coordinating for National Security 
Sec. 101. National Security Council 
Sec. 102. Central Intelligence Agency 
Sec. 103. National Security Resources Board 
Title II—The National Military Establishment 
Sec. 201. National Military Establishment 
Sec. 202. Secretary of Defense 
Sec. 203. Military Assistants to the Secretary 
Sec. 204. Civilian personnel 
Sec. 205. Department of the Army 
Sec. 206. Department of the Navy 
Sec. 207. Department of the Air Force 
Sec. 208. United States Air Force 
Sec. 209. Effective date of transfers 
Sec. 210. War Council 
Sec. 211. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Sec. 212. Joint Staff 
Sec. 213. Munitions Board 
Sec 214. Research and Development Board 
Title III—Miscellaneous 
Sec. 301. Compensation of Secretaries 
Sec. 302. Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries 
Sec. 303. Advisory committees and personnel 
Sec. 304. Status of transferred civilian personnel 
Sec. 305. Saving provisions 
Sec. 306. Transfer of funds 
Sec. 307. Authorization for appropriations 
Sec. 308. Definitions 
Sec. 309. Separability 
Sec. 310. Effective date 
Sec. 311. Succession to the Presidency 
                                                 
185 U.S. Congress, The National Security Act of 1947, 495–496. 
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APPENDIX C 
Recommendation No. 2186—Increased Authority to the Secretary of Defense 
a. That the principle of unified civilian control and accountability be the guiding rule for all 
legislation concerned with the National Military Establishment and that full authority 
and accountability be centered in the Secretary of Defense, subject only to the President 
and to Congress. 
b. That all statutory authority now vested in the service departments, or their subordinate 
units, be granted directly to the Secretary of Defense, subject to the authority of the 
President, with further authority to delegate them as he sees fir and wise. 
c. That the Secretary of Defense shall have full authority, subject only to the President and 
the Congress, to establish policies and programs. 
d. That the service secretaries be deprived of their privilege of appeal over the head of the 
Secretary of Defense; that they be directly and exclusively responsible to him; that the 
Secretary of Defense be the sole agent reporting to the President; that the service 
secretaries, to clarify their positions, be designated the Under Secretaries for Army, 
Navy, and Air Force. 
e. That specific provisions be made that the three military services shall be administered by 
the several under secretaries subject to the full direction and authority of the Secretary of 
Defense 
f. That there shall be Joint Chiefs of Staff representing the three services, appointed by the 
President and subject to confirmation by the Senate and that the Secretary of Defense, 
with the President’s approval, shall appoint a chairman to preside over the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and to represent, and report to, the Secretary of Defense. 
g. That all administrative authority be centered in the Secretary of Defense, subject only to 
the authority of the President, including full and final authority over preparation of the 
military budget and over the expenditure of funds appropriated by the Congress. 
h. That the Secretary be provided with an Under Secretary of Defense, who shall be his full 
deputy and act for him in his absence, and three assistant secretaries; and that the 
Secretary of Defense be empowered to set up such personal assistants to himself as he 
shall require to relieve him of day-to-day detail, to advise and assist him in planning and 
carrying out programs, and to organize this staff as he sees fit. 
i. That the full authority of the procurement and management of supplies and materiel be 
vested in the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary can delegate this authority to the 
Munitions Board (or to other officers or agencies as he may determine) with directions 
to expedite by all possible means the elimination of costly duplication in procurement 
and waste in utilization among the three services. Our further recommendations 
                                                 
186 The Hoover Commission Report, 193–195. 
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regarding the coordination of military with civilian supply manage are contained in the 
Commission’s report on the Office of General Services. 
